The lessons learnt from this fire were:-

1. No personal lines - Team members got separated and lost. This lead to the death of 2 firemen.
2. No main or branch guide lines - In the case of the former, the distance between the main entrance to the incident and the fire was some 500 yards. The hose being used as a guide line was so long and snaked under pressure that it was difficult and sometimes impossible to follow. As a result of the snaking travel distances were increased dramatically.
3. The sets in use were of relatively short duration (20 minutes). In taking the extended route in and what was thought to be a more direct route out, men lost contact with the hose, costing the life of a Divisional Officer who ran out of air.
4. The Communications equipment used was not successful as it became entangled with other equipment. Communications was lost in the early stages of the fire. Communication between crews with Proto sets was non-existent but compressed air sets with face masks allowed good intercommunications between crew members.
5. RAF had no recording or supervising procedures thus there was a lack of knowledge for responding local authority crews.
6. 1(1)(d) visits were very few and the sparse information and lack of plans available die not assist firemen as to the best route to take to the seat of the fire.
7. Relief crews sent in 5 minutes before time of whistle - No appreciation made of the time for relief crews to enter and reach the fire and working crews to return to control.
8. Distress Signal Unites not available - When men got lost or separated these would have assisted in locating them.
9. Heat problems - As men were never trained in heat, there were severe operational problems, even for experienced crews.

In 1966, the Home Office issued TECHNICAL BULLETIN 10/1966. This included the physical specification for the DSU, methods of attachments to sets and the prescribed testing procedure.

In an effort to produce a recognised evacuation signal for use on the fire ground, Chief Officers were circulated with a DEAR CHIEF OFFICER LETTER No 25/1966. This letter requested brigades to give details of any evacuation procedures currently used and any other views on the subject