Once again there were lessons to be learned. The same problems occurred at Smithfield as had occurred at the two previous fires at Covent Garden. the single exception was a local procedure set up by the London Fire Brigades in 1956 following the second Covent Garden Fire. This was the provision of a Control Point set up in Charterhouse Lane to record the entry of men into the BA incident. The Control Point consisted of a blackboard and recorded:

a) Name
b) Station
c) Time of entry
d) Time due out

This procedure proved invaluable and was to indicate later in the incident that two men were missing and overdue.

JANUARY
Following the loss of life at Smithfield and Covent Garden, January 1958 saw calls for a more comprehensive schedule of BA procedures to be formulated. These calls came from Mr Delve, Chief Fire Officer of London, Mr Leete, Deputy Chief Fire Officer of London and Mr Horner of the Fire Brigades Union. In addition the FBU circulated its 20000 members with a questionnaire on possible procedures and invited suggestions with a £100 prize for the best.

FEBRUARY
Due to the outcry over the recent deaths of firemen, the Home Office set up a Committee of Inquiry into the operational use of BA. This was a sub-committee of the Central Fire Brigades Advisory Council. It appeared from its first meeting that some efforts had previously been made by the Home Office to establish a procedure for the use of BA but nothing had been circulated to brigades on the progress made.

JUNE
Twelve brigades were circulated with a trial procedure.

AUGUST
By this date a number of observations and recommendations had been received by the Committee of Inquiry which began to prepare an interim report.

OCTOBER
FIRE SERVICE CIRCULAR 37/1958 was issued. It detailed the findings of the Committee of Inquiry and recommended the following:-

1. Tallies for BA sets
2. A Stage I and Stage II control procedure for recording & supervising BA wearers.
3. The duties of a control operator.
4. The procedure to be followed by crews.
5. A main control procedure.

Paragraph 4 of the accompanying letter to the above Circular requested brigades to report their observations and recommendations in light of experience by the end of November 1959. The letter goes on to say that no specifications for the design and use of guide or personnel lines will be issued until more experience had been gained. Recommendations were, however, made in respect of a specification for

1. Low cylinder pressure warning device.
2. Distress signal device.