The lessons learnt from this fire were:-

1. No guidelines - Hose used for this purpose was difficult to trace in the deepening water which eventually reached four feet in depth.
2. Men worked alone - In trying to rescue a colleague, one fireman became so exhausted he barely made it back to street level to summon assistance. As it happened he collapsed and vital minutes were lost in the rescue attempt.
3. No recording and supervising procedures for men entering and leaving the incident in BA.
4. No method of summoning assistance in an emergency as with present day DSU.
5. Communications were bad to non-existent - These consisted of signals or as was often practised, the mouthpiece was removed thereby allowing the ingress of toxic products into the respiratory tract.
6. No minimum charging pressure for BA cylinders. Many were only 2/3 full.
7. No low cylinder pressure warning device.
8. Many donned BA but did not start up until it was absolutely essential by which time they had taken in quantities of smoke and gases which had its effects. It would appear that an ability to “eat smoke” and the time taken to service sets were contributing factors in this procedure.

It is interesting to note that none of the above points were deemed worthy of further investigation and it was considered that the brigade’s organisation was satisfactory, as stated in the Chief Fire Officer, Mr F W Delve’s report dated 24 January 1950 to the London City Council.